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User Oriented Resource Management with
Virtualization: A Hierarchical Game Approach
Lingxia Wang∗, Chungang Yang∗, Xinwei Wang∗, F. Richard Yu‡, and Victor C. M. Leung§
Abstract—The explosive advancements in mobile Internet and
Internet of Things challenge the network capacity and architec-
ture. The ossification of wireless networks hinders the further
evolution towards the fifth generation of mobile communication
systems. Ultra-dense small cell networks are considered as a
feasible way to meet high-capacity demands. Meanwhile, ultra-
dense small cell network virtualization also exploits an insightful
perspective for the evolution because of its superiority, such as
diversity, flexibility, low cost, and scalability. In this paper, we
specify the necessity of resource management in virtualized ultra-
dense small cell networks through a mapping and management
architecture, and consider the problem of user-oriented virtual
resource management. Then, we model the virtual resource
management problem as a hierarchical game and obtain the
closed-form solutions for spectrum, power, and price, respectively.
Furthermore, we propose a customer-first (CF) algorithm that
characterizes the user-oriented service of virtualization, and an-
alyze its convergence. Simulation results present the effectiveness
of the proposed CF algorithm.
Index Terms—Hierarchical game, low-complexity, user-
oriented, ultra-dense small cell networks, virtualization.
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of mobile Internet and Internet of
Things and the emergence of various services have led to
high-capacity demands, which challenge the network capacity
and architecture. The fifth-generation of mobile communi-
cation systems aims at breaking the capacity bottleneck by
densification [1]. The basic idea is to form ultra-dense small
cell networks to promote network capacity by increasing the
deployment density of low-power small base stations [2], [3].
However, network densification introduces even more complex
challenges. For example, the capacity limitation exacerbated
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by scarce wireless resources and the network load imbalance
in ultra-dense small cell networks are among the challenges.
Therefore, when scarce resources encounter explosive de-
mands, it is urgent to approach the perfect matching of
resources and demands by effective resource management
methods to boost network capacity and balance network load.
Moreover, the ossification of ultra-dense small cell networks
grows steadily. On the one hand, the operating expenses and
capital expenses are high because of the dense deployment
of small base stations. Hence, it is necessary to convert
the service mode from physical to virtual entities to reduce
expenses [4]. On the other hand, it is hard to bring in new
technologies or adjust the existing technologies because of
the complex composition of infrastructure service providers.
Consequently, the decoupling of services and infrastructures
is necessary in order to meet more service demands.
Ultra-dense small cell network virtualization can solve the
ossification problem and has been considered as a promising
technology for the evolution of the fifth-generation of mobile
communication systems [5]. Based on [6], we define ultra-
dense small cell network virtualization as follows. By virtu-
alization, the physical resources of small base stations can be
completely abstracted, pooled, and integrated into many virtual
resources, which then can be shared by multiple virtual entities
[7], [8].
For one thing, the nature of virtualization is a resource
sharing technology. Resource virtualization can provide the
complete set of resources to serve users flexibly [9]. By
integrating the resources of multiple small base stations and
converting the service mode from physical to virtual entities,
the resources can be shared among different demands. For
another, by the decoupling of services and infrastructures, vir-
tualization can provide a platform for the current architecture
and implement new technologies, functionalities, and applica-
tions. The feasibility of abstracting all available resources of
multiple small base stations is studied in [10].
In virtual networks, resource management plays an impor-
tant role in boosting network capacity, improving resource uti-
lization, promoting quality of service, and balancing network
load, especially in virtualized ultra-dense small cell networks.
The cuboid filling model [11] describes the significance of
effective resource management schemes intuitively. It means
that effective resource management schemes can make the
cuboid fully filled and leave resource holes as little as possible.
Resource management in virtual networks aims at approaching
the perfect matching between resources and demands.
One of the main aims of virtual resource management is
to provide user-oriented customized service by abstracting
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resources and demands. Meanwhile, through forming virtu-
alized ultra-dense small cell networks and converting the
architecture from cell-centric to user-centric, user quality of
service can also be enhanced [3]. Therefore, it is beneficial
to bring virtualization into ultra-dense small cell networks to
implement the goal of user-oriented resource management in
the fifth-generation of mobile communication systems.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II surveys the different works related to virtual resource
management and summarizes the contributions of the paper. In
section III, we introduce the system model and assumptions,
present the proposed two-layer architecture, and specify the
necessity of resource management in virtual networks. In
section IV, we formulate the resource management problem
for different entities. In section V, we provide the closed-form
solutions for spectrum, power, price, and analyze the existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium solution. Furthermore, we
propose a distributed virtual resource management algorithm.
Simulation results are presented in section VI. Followed by
the conclusions in section VII.
II. RELATED WORK AND CONTRIBUTIONS
In this section, we review works that relate to virtual
resource management. We survey the virtual resource man-
agement schemes based on optimization theory, cooperative
game, and non-cooperative game, and discuss in detail how
our proposed scheme based on hierarchical game advances
the state of the art. We then summarize and highlight the
contributions of this paper.
A. Related Work Based on Optimization Theory
So far, there have been many types of research about
virtual resource management in the academic community
[12]–[16]. A survey about the challenges and techniques of
resource management in virtualized networks is investigated
in [12]. In [13], scheduling resource blocks among different
service providers is studied, and the spectrum demands of
providers are determined according to an evaluation mecha-
nism. Moreover, the performance of different schemes with
or without virtualization is compared, showing the advantage
of virtualization in improving spectrum utilization. An uplink
virtual spectrum allocation scheme is presented in [14], which
defines the utilities of users, service providers, and mobile
network operators by treating sub-carriers as commodities.
Meanwhile, the spectrum demands of users are given, and the
price is fixed for all users. Furthermore, the authors in [15]
consider a spectrum waste that the demands are calculated
at the peak and are fixed in the whole day, and propose
an algorithm based on the opportunistic spectrum sharing
allocation. Another spectrum waste is considered in [16], and
the primary operators divide their spectrum resource and lease
a certain percentage of the spectrum to a given mobile virtual
network operator. Hence, resources are wasted if they are
neither used by the primary operators nor leased to the mobile
virtual network operators. Thus, by setting high percentages of
leasing to the mobile virtual network operators, the spectrum
resource utilization can be enhanced significantly.
Resource management with virtualization in small cell
networks is investigated in [17] and [18]. The authors in
[17] introduce a resource negotiation in virtualized LTE-A
small cell networks, whose main idea is to reallocate the
spectrum resources of two base stations to respond to traffic
dynamics. Furthermore, in [18], a scalable resource negotiation
is proposed in LTE-A heterogeneous ultra-dense small cell
networks. The authors focus on enabling base stations to
interconnect through the logical X2 interface and proceed with
reallocating resources cooperatively based on the traffic. The
extra signaling overhead is analyzed and calculated. Moreover,
the scheme can be applied in multi-service and multi-operator
scenarios.
Discussions: The distinctions between our paper and the
above paper [13]–[18] are mainly in server points. First,
different from [13], using a contract constraint to allocate
bandwidth, our paper defines detailed utilities for virtual
resource providers (VRPs) and virtual resource requesters
(VRRs), and obtains the closed-form solutions for the demands
of VRRs to perform on-demand allocation. Second, different
from [14] in which the price is fixed for all users, the price
for VRRs is adaptive based on the demands of VRRs in our
paper. Next, both [15] and [16] study opportunistic spectrum
sharing allocation, while we concentrate on the complete
matching between resources and demands. Then, [17] and [18]
focus on traffic-variational resource allocation and signaling
overhead, and we investigate on-demand resource allocation
and energy efficient. In addition, based on the above review, we
can find out that many virtual resource management schemes
are centralized, which are not suitable for large-scale ultra-
dense small cell network scenarios because of high signaling
overhead [13]–[16]. A few schemes are distributed but only
consider spectrum allocation, and the transmission power per
resource block is fixed and equal among small base stations
[17], [18]. Moreover, when the scenarios become complex,
and the optimal objectives increase, it is difficult to use these
schemes to model and describe the complicated interactions.
Therefore, a more effective method is necessary for modeling
and solving the resource management problem in complex
scenarios. Different from [13]–[18], we develop a distributed
scheme to perform user-oriented virtual resource management
in ultra-dense small cell networks based on game theory.
Game theory has been a promising method for studying
resource management problem because of the following ad-
vantages.
• First, game theory comprises of abundant game models
and is an effective modeling tool to depict and reflect dif-
ferent interactions and constraints among VRRs, VRPs,
and both.
• Second, there exists an equilibrium state to achieve the
optimal utility.
• Lastly, game theory is appropriate for designing dis-
tributed schemes.
B. Related Work Based on Game Theory
The cooperative game refers that players are cooperative and
emphasizes on collective rationality. Spectrum management
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with virtualization based on different cooperative game models
in different networks is studied in [19], [21], and [23]. A
bankruptcy game model is established in [19] to achieve
resource block allocation based on the LTE virtualization
architecture proposed in [20]. The cooperative game model is
proposed according to a specific predefined contract. The main
idea is that the resources are abstracted into a pool and can
be shared among mobile virtual operators. A bargaining game
model is modeled for bandwidth allocation in Infrastructure
as a service (IaaS) data center networks in [21] to achieve
fairness. Two main objectives are achieved, including basic
bandwidth guarantee based on the bandwidth requirements of
virtual machines and residual bandwidth reallocation based
on the weights of virtual machines. Moreover, both offline
algorithm and online algorithm are developed to optimize Nash
bargaining solution. A resource allocation mechanism in IaaS
cloud system based on coalition game and the uncertainty of
game theory [22] is presented in [23]. The cloud is modeled
as a multi-agent set, and different agents have different capa-
bilities. Resource virtualization is done by forming coalitions
among multiple agents, and then the virtual resources are
allocated to different agents with different tasks. In addition,
a power allocation scheme based on the cooperative game
in wireless relay virtual networks is proposed in [24]. The
authors indicate that combining cooperative communication
into virtual networks can promote the network performance
toward delay-sensitive multimedia services in mobile wireless
networks. The proposed scheme can satisfy the diverse re-
quirements for wireless multimedia services.
The non-cooperative game refers that players are non-
cooperative and emphasizes on individual rationality. The
bandwidth allocation problem is modeled as a non-cooperative
game in [25], and Nash equilibrium is obtained in a simple
physical topology scenario. In addition, a pricing-based power
resource allocation optimization problem in wireless virtual
networks is studied in [26] to maximize the energy efficiency
of virtual network operators based on non-cooperative game.
The authors in [27] develop two effective resource manage-
ment approaches on account of both cooperative and non-
cooperative game in cloud federation, which is an emerging
technology to improve the utilization ratio of cloud resources.
A trust index is created to filter out untrustworthy cloud service
providers, and then the resource management approaches are
applied to trusted cloud service providers.
Hierarchical game [28]–[30] is non-cooperative in nature
which has different hierarchies with different utilities. Several
resource management with virtualization works have been
done using hierarchical game [31]–[34]. A bandwidth allo-
cation approach between service providers and infrastructure
providers based on two-layer non-cooperative game in cellular
networks is proposed in [31]. The first layer is that each
infrastructure provider decides whether to accept the request
of the service provider. The second layer is that different
service providers compete for bandwidth in a shared infras-
tructure provider. A three-stage Stackelberg model is used to
formulate and model the spectrum and power management
problem with full-duplex and virtualization in the cellular
network [32]. There are four logical roles, including spectrum
providers, base station providers, relay providers, and service
providers. A hierarchical game approach [33] in softwarized
networks is explored to design a distributed network function
virtualization system, which is beneficial to telecom operators.
The servers’ relationship is modeled as non-cooperation game,
and the users’ relationship is modeled as evolutionary game.
A reinforcement learning method is developed to accelerate
convergence. Resource allocation in fog computing networks
is studied in [34]. Hierarchical game is used to handle the
challenges in resource matching and information asymmetry,
which takes data service subscribers, fog nodes, and data
service operators into account.
Discussions: Several points in our paper are different from
the above papers [31]–[34]. On the one hand, the idea in
[31] is to allocate bandwidth between service providers and
infrastructure providers, while our paper jointly considers user-
oriented adaptive spectrum allocation, adaptive power alloca-
tion, and adaptive price allocation between VRPs and VRRs.
Moreover, a distributed and nested scheme is developed in our
paper, in which the inner nest aims to perform user-oriented
virtual resource blocks (VRBs) and power allocation for given
price to maximize each VRR’ utility, and the outer nest aims
to decide the price for each VRR to maximize the VRP’
utility. Further, the interaction between the inner nest and
the outer nest finally converges to equilibrium. On the other
hand, the power optimization and the bandwidth optimization
are separate in [32], whereas we formulate and analyze VRR
utility as a joint optimization function in spectrum and power.
In addition, the scenarios in [33] and [34] are softwarized
networks and fog computing networks, while our focus is
virtualized ultra-dense small cell networks.
C. Contributions
Although a number of research on resource management
in virtualized networks based on game theory have been
done, user-oriented virtual resource management based on
hierarchical game in ultra-dense small cell networks is still
at the beginning level. In this paper, we jointly consider the
number of VRBs scheduled to VRRs, the power assigned to
VRRs, and the price determined by VRPs. In this way, user
quality of service and network performance can be improved.
The contributions are summarized as follows.
• A two-layer architecture is presented to map the resource
management problem from physical to virtual networks.
We specify the necessity of resource management in
virtual networks. Virtualized resource management in
ultra-dense small cell networks can be decomposed into
two entities, VRPs and VRRs. The decomposition enables
flexibility in the process of network management.
• Hierarchical game is adapted to depict and reflect the
matching interactions between VRPs and VRRs in the
proposed two-layer architecture, and also to model the
virtualized resource management problem and maximize
each entity’s revenue. By jointly considering the number
of VRBs scheduled to VRRs and the power assigned to
VRRs, energy-efficiency and on-demand allocation are
taken into account.
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• We exploit and explore the nature of virtualization in
which resources and demands are aspectant. We further
propose a low-complexity distributed customer-first (CF)
scheme that characterizes the user-oriented service of
virtualization to improve user quality of service, reduce
network energy overhead, and promote network resource
utilization ratio.
• The existence and uniqueness of sub-game perfect equi-
librium (SPE) and hierarchical Nash equilibrium (HNE)
are analyzed and proved for the proposed CF scheme.
• Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the pro-
posed scheme in improving network utility, system rate,
network energy efficiency, network resource utilization
ratio, and reducing user access-reject probability.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we illustrate the virtual network model and
the two-layer architecture in a straightforward and insightful
perspective.
A. Virtual Network Model
After virtualization, the services are decoupled and the
resources are abstracted from infrastructures, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 1, we present a virtual network model
including infrastructure layer, pool layer, and service layer.
The infrastructure layer has many small base stations, which
own physical resource blocks (PRBs). The pool layer consists
of a large number of VRBs, which are abstracted from the
infrastructure layer and mapped from PRBs. A VRB has the
same size as a PRB. VRB is distributed, which means the
sub-carriers scheduled to one VRR are scattered on the whole
bandwidth. Moreover, more than one VRB can be scheduled
to one VRR in each transmission time interval. The service
layer is composed of lots of VRRs. These VRRs are contained
in different virtual networks based on geographic locations,
channel conditions, and service types. There are three virtual
networks in the service layer of Fig. 1. The solid lines depict
virtual networks. The dotted lines represent VRRs, and the
colored VRBs contained therein are scheduled to VRRs. Each
virtual network serves a certain number of VRRs and different
VRRs may have different demands to ensure communication.
By virtualization, some details in the infrastructure layer can
be shielded, and the available resources are integrated to be
managed uniformly by the pool layer. The service layer can
get rid of the management and control of the infrastructure
layer, carrying out self-operating and self-management mode
to provide user-oriented service. VRRs in the service layer
are serviced by leasing resources from the pool layer, and
the pool layer obtains revenue by providing resources for the
service layer. Therefore, the resource management problem in
virtualized ultra-dense small cell networks is mainly to achieve
the matching between pool layer and service layer as much
as possible, and determine the transmission power. That is,
resources can be fully used, and VRRs can be served with
satisfaction, which promotes network throughput positively.
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Fig. 1. Virtual network model.
B. Two-layer Architecture
Fig. 2 depicts the proposed two-layer architecture. Two
essential elements, physical networks and virtual networks
are included. In physical networks, the components related
to resource management are demands and resources, and the
resource management problem is the matching of the demands
and resources of each small base station. In virtual networks,
the components related to resource management are abstracted
as VRRs and VRPs. The resource management problem is
the matching of the demands and resources of all small base
stations, which corresponds to the matching of the service
layer and the pool layer in Fig. 1. We can observe the
relationship between two elements in Fig. 2. The traffic in
physical networks can be mapped as the demands of VRRs
in virtual networks, which is equivalent to the decoupling
of the infrastructure layer and the service layer in Fig. 1.
The resources in physical networks can be virtualized and
managed by VRPs in virtual networks, which is equivalent
to the abstracting of the infrastructure layer and the pool layer
in Fig. 1.
In virtual networks, VRPs own all available resources to
provide customized service to VRRs. VRPs are providers,
and VRRs are requesters. For example, if we treat VRBs as
commodity, VRRs and VRPs play the role of suppliers and
customers, respectively, and the related condition is the price
provided by VRPs and the demands provided by VRRs. Mean-
while, the transmission power of VRRs should be determined,
taking energy efficiency into account.
C. Channel Model
Suppose that there is one VRP providing service and M
VRRs receiving service, ∀m ∈ M. The VRP owns K VRBs.
The transmission rate of VRR m can be denoted as
Rm = bmκlog2(1 + γm), (1)
where bm is the number of VRBs scheduled to VRR m. κ is
the size of each VRB. bmκ denotes the bandwidth occupied
by VRR m. γm is the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of
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Fig. 2. Two-layer architecture.
VRR m. Consider an additive white Gaussian noise channel,
γm can be denoted as
γm =
pmgm
N0
, (2)
where pm is the power allocated to VRR m. gm is the link
gain of VRR m. N0 denotes the background noise power.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we formulate the user-oriented resource
management problem with virtualization as a hierarchical
game model in ultra-dense small cell networks. The formulated
model takes customized allocation into account.
Definition 1: The hierarchical game model is a two-layer
game, namely VRP and VRR. In this game, the VRP firstly
moves by deciding and broadcasting the price for all VRRs
on the basis of VRRs’ demands to maximize the VRP’ utility,
and then VRRs move subsequently by deciding the demands
for VRBs based on the communication requirements and the
price provided by the VRP, and determining the transmission
power to maximize each VRR’ utility.
A. Resource Management of VRR
In the VRR layer, VRRs evaluate the demands for VRBs
and the power to maximize the utility. We only consider one
VRP and focus on the number of VRBs. Inspired by [30], we
TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATIONS
Symbol Meaning
K the number of VRBs
M the set of VRRs
m the index of the VRR
UV RRm the utility of VRR m
UV RP the utility of the VRP
bm the number of VRBs scheduled to VRR m
κ the size of each VRB
γm the received SNR of VRR m
pm the power allocated to VRR m
gm the link gain of VRR m
N0 the background noise power
` the unit revenue in the transmission rate
$m the price of unit bandwidth for VRR m
γth the minimum required SNR for VRRs
pmax the maximum power
adopt the quadratic utility function to formulate the utility of
VRR m:
UV RRm = `Rm −$mbmκ−
1
2
(bmκ)2, (3)
where ` is related to the revenue in the transmission rate by
occupying VRBs. Rm is the transmission rate of VRR m.
$m is the price of unit bandwidth for VRR m provided by
the VRP. bmκ denotes the bandwidth occupied by VRR m.
The motivations for using (3) include the following aspects.
• The utility UV RRm is concave versus the demand bm
and the power pm with boundary condition. Thus, it is
workable to get the maximum utility of UV RRm .
• The demand function bm is linear versus the price $m.
It facilitates the analysis for the VRP.
The resource management problem in the VRR layer is to
maximize the utility of VRR m while guaranteeing the related
constraints as follows:
max
bm,pm
UV RRm (bm, pm|$m),∀m ∈M, (4)
s.t.
bm = 1, ...,K − 1,∀m ∈M, (5)
M∑
m=1
bm = 1, ...,K − 1, (6)
γm ≥ γth,∀m ∈M, (7)
0 <
M∑
m=1
pm ≤ pmax, (8)
where γth is the minimum required SNR for VRRs. Constraint
(5) means that each VRR accepts service and the required
VRBs are no more than the total number of VRBs. Constraint
(6) indicates that the required VRBs of all VRRs do not exceed
the total number of VRBs. Constraint (7) sets the minimum
threshold γth and represents that the received SNR of any VRR
should be greater than the minimum required SNR. Constraint
(8) means that the power of any VRR m should be greater
than 0 and the total power of all VRRs is no more than the
maximum power pmax.
B. Pricing of VRP
In the VRP layer, the VRP gets revenue by leasing VRBs
with appropriate price, which is related to the number of VRBs
scheduled to VRRs. We define the utility function of the VRP
as
UV RP =
M∑
m=1
$mbmκ. (9)
In the same way, the resource management problem in the
VRP layer is to maximize the utility of the VRP by the
following optimization problem:
max
$m
UV RP ($m|bm, pm), (10)
s.t.
$m > 0,∀m ∈M. (11)
2169-3536 (c) 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2845913, IEEE Access
6
The VRP and VRRs are all autonomous decision-makers,
who are rational and selfish. Each VRB is exclusively allocated
to one VRR and one VRR can use more than one VRB in each
transmission time interval.
In summary, we divide the resource management problem
into two parts. For VRR m, the demand bm and the power
pm are to be optimized. For the VRP, the price $m is to be
optimized. Both the VRP and VRRs expect to maximize their
utilities, respectively.
V. ANALYSIS OF HIERARCHICAL GAME
In this section, we analyze the formulated problem for
VRRs and obtain the solution b∗m, p
∗
m in subsection A. We
also analyze the formulated problem for the VRP and get
the solution $∗m in subsection B. We prove the existence and
uniqueness of hierarchical game in subsection C. Finally, the
proposed CF algorithm is represented in subsection D.
Definition 2: The solution of the hierarchical game model
is named HNE and can be obtained by backward induction
method. HNE is composed of {b∗m, p∗m, $∗m,∀m ∈M}, where
b∗m is the optimal number of VRBs scheduled to VRR m
and p∗m is the optimal power allocated to VRR m. Both are
VRR m’ strategies to maximize the utility of VRR m . $∗m
is the optimal price for VRR m, which is the VRP’ strategy
to maximize the utility of the VRP.
A. Analysis of VRR
The solutions of the formulated problem for VRR m are
the demand bm (integer) and the power pm (continuous). The
utility function is nonlinear. Hence, the problem is a mixed
integer nonlinear programming, which is NP-hard in general.
Thus, we transfer (4) into continuous space. The original
problem is relaxed as follows:
max
bm,pm
UV RRm (bm, pm|$m),∀m ∈M, (12)
s.t.
bm > 0,∀m ∈M, (13)
M∑
m=1
bm < K, (14)
γm ≥ γth,∀m ∈M, (15)
0 <
M∑
m=1
pm ≤ pmax. (16)
(12) is a multi-variable problem with continuous space.
Given a feasible price for VRR m, we can get the solution of
bm and pm based on (1)(2)(3) and (12). The solving steps are
described as follows:
• By the property of Hessian Matrix, we ensure the con-
cavity of UV RRm . Moreover, the constraint set is affine
because it consists of linear constraints. Thus, the formu-
lated problem is a convex problem.
• Based on decomposition theory, we convert the multi-
variable problem into two dependent single-variable prob-
lems, i.e., the problem for spectrum adaptation (for bm)
and the problem for power adaptation (for pm).
• The two single-variable problems can be solved by the
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions.
• The solutions for the two problems are interactive and
the unique SPE in the VRR layer can be found.
Theorem 1: The utility function UV RRm is concave if ∀m ∈
M, bm satisfy
bm ≥ `
κ ln 2
. (17)
Proof: Hessian Matrix is adopted to guarantee the strict
concavity of UV RRm . First, we make a preliminary definition
including A = ∂
2UVRRm
∂b2m
, B = ∂
2UVRRm
∂bm∂pm
, C = ∂
2UVRRm
∂p2m
. Then,
we derive the second-order derivative of UV RRm with respect
to bm and pm, respectively.
∂2UV RRm
∂b2m
= −κ2, (18)
∂2UV RRm
∂bm∂pm
=
`κgm
N0(1 + γm) ln 2
, (19)
∂2UV RRm
∂p2m
= − `κg
2
mbm
N0
2(1 + γm)
2 ln 2
. (20)
We can observe A < 0, C < 0. We guarantee the non-
negative definiteness of Hessian Matrix by deriving the suffi-
cient condition of AC − B2 = ικ2g2m(κbmln2−ι)
(N0+pmgm)
2(ln 2)2
≥ 0. Thus,
when bm ≥ `κ ln 2 , UV RRm is concave.
According to Theorem 1, the minimal bm should satisfy
(17) to ensure the concavity of UV RRm . It is also known that
the affine constraint set is convex set. Notice that since we
are facing a convex optimization problem, a local optimum
of the problem is also globally optimal. In addition, duality
gap is zero under the constraints, so the KKT conditions are
necessary and sufficient. In the following, we first transform
the objective problem into two problems based on decompo-
sition theory, and then use the KKT conditions to solve the
two problems, respectively [35].
1) Spectrum adaptation: Based on (12), for a given price
$m and a feasible power pm, VRR m can evaluate the demand
for VRBs by solving the following problem:
max
bm
UV RRm ,∀m ∈M, (21)
s.t.
bm ≥ `
κ ln 2
,∀m ∈M, (22)
M∑
m=1
bm ≤ K. (23)
The Lagrangian function is as follows:
L(bm, νm, λ) = `Rm −$mbmκ− 12 (bmκ)2 − νm( `κ ln 2 − bm)
−λ(
M∑
m=1
bm −K).
(24)
We know Lagrangian multipliers are nonnegative, i.e., νm ≥
0, λ ≥ 0. With the KKT conditions, we have the Lagrange
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derivation equation with the complementary slackness condi-
tions for VRR m as
∂L(bm, νm, λ)
∂bm
= 0, (25)
νm(
`
κ ln 2
− bm) = 0, (26)
λ(
M∑
m=1
bm −K) = 0. (27)
We can see if bm 6= `κ ln 2 , there is νm=0. The same to
(28), there is λ = 0 if
M∑
m=1
bm 6= K. According to (25), we
can obtain
`κlog2(1 +
pmgm
N0
)−$mκ− κ2bm + νm − λ = 0. (28)
Thus, we have b∗m as follows:
b∗m =
{
1
κ
[`log2(1 + γm)−$m] +
1
κ2
(νm − λ)
}
. (29)
From (29), we can observe b∗m is related with the power
strategy pm and the price strategy $m. Given a feasible power
pm and price $m, we can get the number of VRBs scheduled
to VRR m.
Sub-gradient method [35] is used to update the Lagrangian
multiplier νm and λ. Thus, we have
νt+1m = [ν
t
m + τ
t(
`
κ ln 2
− b∗m)]+, (30)
λt+1 = [λt + τ t(
M∑
m=1
b∗m −K)]+, (31)
where []+ denotes the projection onto the non-negative area.
τ t is an adjustable stepsize, which sensitively affects the
convergence. Theoretically, τ t can be constant or diminishing.
However, the convergence cannot be guaranteed when using
the constant stepsize τ t = τ1, τ1 > 0, which is because the
iteration may repeatedly proceed near the closed-form optimal
solution. On the contrary, by using the adjustable diminishing
stepsize, where τ1 > 0, lim
t→∞ τ
t = 0 and
∞∑
t=1
τ t = ∞, the
convergence of the optimal solution can be guaranteed. For
example, in our implementation, we set τ t = τ
1
t , τ
1 = 1,
t = 1, 2, .... The initialization are ν1m = 4 ∗ 103 and λ1 = 10.
Furthermore, without loss of generality, we set the iterative
terminal conditions using∥∥νt+1m − νtm∥∥ ≤ ε1, (32)∥∥λt+1 − λt∥∥ ≤ ε2, (33)
where ε1 and ε2 are any small positive.
We can learn that with the convergence settings of (32)
and (33), bm can converge to a steady solution after lim-
ited iterations. The detailed user-oriented spectrum adaptation
scheme for all VRRs is shown in Algorithm 1, which can be
implemented distributively. That is, each VRR updates its own
multipliers νm and λ until convergence.
Algorithm 1 User-oriented spectrum adaptation
Input: M , {pm}, {gm}, {$m}, N0, κ, `, K.
Output: {bm}, {νm}, λ.
1: Initialization: νm ← 4 ∗ 103, λ ← 10, τ ← 1, t ← 1
2: while not converged do .
3: Update λ using (31).
4: for all m ∈M do
5: Update νm according to (30).
6: Calculate bm according to (43).
7: end for
8: t← t+ 1.
9: τ ← 1/t.
10: end while
11: b∗m=ceil(bm).
Up to now, we have gotten the solution for b∗m by solving
(21). We should map the solution to the original problem.
The common method is to round up to an integer. Thus, the
solution is given by the following operation:
b∗m = db∗me . (34)
2) Power adaptation: Based on (12), for a given price $m
and the obtained demand b∗m, the power of VRR m can be
obtained by solving the following problem:
max
pm
(UV RRm |b∗m),∀m ∈M, (35)
s.t.
γm ≥ γth,∀m ∈M, (36)
0 <
M∑
m=1
pm ≤ pmax. (37)
Similar to the problem for spectrum adaptation, we can form
the Lagrangian function as follows:
L˜(pm, φm, pi) = `Rm −$mbmκ− 12 (bmκ)2 − φm(γth − γm)
−pi(
M∑
m=1
pm − pmax),
(38)
where φm and pi are non-negative Lagrangian multipliers. For
each given φm and pi, the power of VRR m can be obtained
by solving the following equation.
p∗m = argmin
pm
L˜(pm, φm, pi). (39)
According to the KKT conditions, we have the following
equations:
∂L˜(pm, φm, pi)
∂pm
= 0, (40)
φm(γth − γm) = 0, (41)
pi(
M∑
m=1
pm − pmax) = 0. (42)
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Algorithm 2 User-oriented power adaptation
Input: M , {bm}, {gm}, N0, κ, ι, γth, pmax.
Output: {pm}.
1: Initialization: φm ← 10−3, pii ← 105, η ← 1, t← 1
2: while not converged do .
3: Update pi using (46).
4: for all m ∈M do
5: Update φm according to (45).
6: Calculate pm according to (43).
7: end for
8: t← t+ 1.
9: η ← 1/t.
10: end while
From (41), we can see if γm 6= γth, φm = 0. Similar to
(42), if
M∑
m=1
pm 6= pmax, pi = 0. Based on (38), we can get
p∗m as
p∗m =
[
bmκ`
(pi − φmgmN0 )ln2
− N0
gm
]pmax
pminm
, (43)
where []yx is the projection onto the area in [x, y]. Based on
(2) and (7), pminm can be obtained as
pminm =
γthN0
gm
. (44)
Moreover, pmax should be configured more than
M∑
m=1
pminm
according to (37). At the same time, pi − φmgmN0 > 0 should
be guaranteed based on (43).
In the same way, sub-gradient projection method is used for
the updating of Lagrangian multipliers:
φt+1m = [φ
t
m + η
t(γth − p
∗
mgm
N0
)]+, (45)
pit+1 = [pit + ηt(
M∑
m=1
p∗m − pmax)]+, (46)
where []+ denotes the projection onto the non-negative area. ηt
is an adjustable stepsize. The same as the analysis of spectrum
management, in our implementation, we use the diminishing
stepsize, and set ηt = η
0/
t, η
0 = 1, t = 1, 2, .... For the initial
multipliers φm and pi, we set φ1m ← 10−3 and pi1 ← 105.
In the same way, we determine the iterative terminal con-
ditions using ∥∥φt+1m − φtm∥∥ ≤ ε3, (47)∥∥pit+1 − pit∥∥ ≤ ε4, (48)
where ε3 and ε4 are any small positive.
With the iterative terminal conditions of (47) and (48), we
can learn that pm can converge to a steady solution after
limited iterations. The detailed user-oriented power adaptation
scheme for all VRRs is shown in Algorithm 2, which can be
implemented distributively. That is, each VRR m updates its
own multipliers φm and pi until convergence.
According to Algorithm 2, the multipliers φm and pi update
accordingly until convergence. Then, the calculated power is
taken into account Algorithm 1, and then an updated demand
is produced, which will be used in Algorithm 2 again. This
procedure will be executed iteratively until convergence, as
shown in Algorithm 3.
3) The existence of SPE: The existence of SPE in the VRR
layer is ensured by the following theorem [36].
Theorem 2: There exists at least one SPE (b∗m, p∗m) in
the VRR layer if ∀m ∈ M: the set (bm, pm) is a nonempty
compact set, and the utility UV RRm is continuous on (bm, pm)
and concave on (bm, pm). (bm, pm) satisfies the following
equation.
(b∗m, p
∗
m) = arg max
b∗m,p∗m
UV RRm . (49)
Proof: As mentioned before, the set is a convex and
compact set, and the utility is continuous on (bm, pm). Further-
more, the joint concavity of UV RRm with respect to (bm, pm) is
proved and guaranteed in Theorem 1. Therefore, at least one
SPE exists.
4) The uniqueness of SPE: The uniqueness of SPE is
ensured by potential game [37] in the following theorem.
Theorem 3: A game [M, sm, Um(·)] is a potential
game if there exists a potential function G(·) that satisfies
Um(sm′, s−m)−Um(sm, s−m) = G(sm′, s−m)−G(sm, s−m),
∀m ∈ M, where sm and sm′ represent any two different
strategies of VRR m.
A sufficient and essential condition to ensure the existence
of G(·) is ∂Um∂sm = ∂G∂sm , ∀m ∈ M. When the condition
is satisfied, the optimum solution of G(·) is the equilibrium
solution.
The game in the VRR layer can be considered as a potential
game if ∀m ∈ M, G(·) is defined as
G = `
M∑
m=1
Rm − κ
M∑
m=1
$mbm − κ
2
2
M∑
m
b2m, (50)
we can prove the potential function G(·) satisfies ∂Um∂bm = ∂G∂bm
and ∂Um∂pm =
∂G
∂pm
.
Proof: It is known that the potential function possesses
some convenient properties. If player m aims at maximizing
G(·), keeping the other players’ strategies invariable, the
equilibrium point will not be changed [38]. In addition, the
potential function G(·) is strictly concave and continuously
differentiable in the non-negative area bounded by
M∑
m=1
pm =
pmax and
M∑
m=1
bm = K. It can be concluded that there exists a
unique solution because UV RRm is strictly concave with respect
Algorithm 3 SPE in the VRR layer
Input: M , {$m}.
Output: {b∗m, p∗m}.
1: Initialization.
2: while not converged do
3: Perform Algorithm 1.
4: Perform Algorithm 2.
5: t← t+ 1.
6: end while
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to (bm, pm), which is proved by (18)(19)(20). In consequence,
the uniqueness of SPE in the VRR layer is ensured.
B. Analysis of VRP
To maximize the total revenue, the VRP needs to decide
the optimal price for VRRs based on the scheduled VRBs. we
substitute (29) into (9) and get
UV RP =
M∑
m=1
$m[
`κlog2(1 +
pmgm
N0
)− κ$m + νm − λ
κ
].
(51)
Theorem 4: The utility UV RP is strictly concave, and the
VRP has the maximum revenue when $∗m satisfies
$∗m =
`
2
log2(1 +
p∗mgm
N0
) +
νm − λ
2κ
. (52)
Proof: We derive the second-order derivative of UV RP
versus $m and get ∂
2UVRP
∂$2m
= − 2κ < 0. Thus, the utility is
strictly concave. Given ∂U
VRP
∂$m
= 0, we can derive $∗m =
`
2 log2(1 +
p∗mgm
N0
) + νm−λ2κ , by which the VRP can get the
maximum revenue.
It can be observed that the optimal price strategy of the
VRP is related to the spectrum strategy and power strategy of
VRRs.
Theorem 5: There exists only one SPE ($∗m) in the VRP
layer if ∀m ∈ M: the set ($m) is a nonempty compact set,
and the utility function UV RP is continuous on ($m) and
strictly concave on ($m). That is, ($m) satisfies ($∗m) =
argmax
$∗m
UV RP .
Proof: The constraint set is affine as it consists of linear
constrains. Thus, it is a convex and compact set. We can also
know that the utility is continuous on ($m). Furthermore, the
strict concavity of UV RP with respect to ($m) is proved and
guaranteed in Theorem 4. Therefore, only one SPE exists.
C. The Existence and Uniqueness of HNE
Definition 3: (b∗m, p∗m, $∗m, ∀m ∈ M) is the unique HNE
for the proposed CF algorithm if and only if (b∗m, p
∗
m, ∀m ∈
M) and ($∗m, ∀m ∈ M) are unique SPEs for each layer,
respectively.
Combining Theorem 2, Theorem 3, and Theorem 5, we
know that (b∗m, p
∗
m, ∀m ∈M) and ($∗m, ∀m ∈M) are unique
SPEs for each layer. Moreover, each SPE is Nash equilibrium
[27], [32]. Therefore, there is a unique HNE (b∗m, p
∗
m, $
∗
m,
∀m ∈ M).
D. CF Algorithm
The details of the proposed CF Algorithm is presented in
Algorithm 4. Due to the leading role of the VRP, the Algorithm
will converge to HNE if for ∀m ∈ M, the price satisfies
‖$t+1m −$tm‖
‖$tm‖ ≤ ε5. Meanwhile, we can observe the scheme
is distributed not only in the VRP layer and the VRR layer
but also within the VRR layer. This is because the VRP and
VRRs are only for maximizing their own utilities. Moreover,
the VRP and VRRs can termly update the CF scheme if the
demand and price change. The convergence and effectiveness
of the proposed CF Algorithm are verified in section VI.
Algorithm 4 CF based on hierarchical game
Input: M .
Output: {b∗m, p∗m, $∗m}.
1: Initialization.
2: while not converged do
3: Perform Algorithm 3.
4: Update prices using (52).
5: t← t+ 1.
6: end while
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, the convergence and effectiveness of the pro-
posed CF Algorithm are demonstrated by simulation results.
The simulation parameters are described as follows.
We consider a hexagon area which is covered by one
VRP and some VRRs. The total number of VRBs is 100,
which are abstracted from all small base stations. The size
of each VRB is 180 kHz. VRRs are distributed randomly
within the hexagon area. The maximal power of each small
base station is set to 30 dBm. The background noise power
N0 is set to -100 dBm. The path loss model is denoted as
PL = 140.7 + 36.7log10(R[km]). The small-scale fading is
modeled as Rayleigh random variables. The minimum required
SNR is set to 5. ` is 100. The basic configurations are based
on 3GPP TR36.814. Each VRR can be serviced by more
than one VRB and each VRB can be used to serve only one
VRR. Meanwhile, it is known that each small base station can
only provide service for a certain number of VRRs if without
virtualization, while the management and the service are more
flexible and beneficial if with virtualization.
A. Convergence
For illustrative purposes, we consider a scenario with 4
VRRs. Fig. 3 verifies the convergence of the proposed CF
scheme, including the convergence of user-oriented spectrum
adaptive algorithm in Fig. 3(a), the convergence of user-
oriented power adaptive algorithm in Fig. 3(b), and the conver-
gence of price adaptive algorithm in Fig. 3(c). In Fig. 3(a), the
X-axis is the number of iterations, and the Y-axis is demand
for each VRR. Similarly to Fig. 3(b) and (c), the X-axis is
the number of iterations, and the Y-axis is power and price
for each VRR, respectively. We can see that demand, power,
and price for each VRR converge quickly with the increasing
number of iterations. It can be observed that the curves start
to converge at the first iteration and reach steady state at the
second iteration. In addition, we can also see that the demands
are different for different VRRs and the corresponding price
provided by the VRP is also different. Furthermore, it can be
seen that when the demands of VRRs are equal (such as VRR
1, VRR 2, and VRR 4 in Fig. 3(a)), the prices are also equal
(such as VRR 1, VRR 2, and VRR 4 in Fig. 3(c)). Moreover,
the higher the demands are (such as VRR 3 and VRR 4 in Fig.
3(a)), the higher the corresponding prices are (such as VRR
3 and VRR 4 in Fig. 3(c)), which is due to the linear relation
between the price and the demand.
2169-3536 (c) 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2845913, IEEE Access
10
???????????? ??? ? ? ? ?
?
?
?
?
???
???????????????????
???????????????????
???????????????????
???????????????????
???????????? ??? ? ? ? ?
?
???
???
???
???
???
??????????????????
??????????????????
??????????????????
??????????????????
???????????? ??? ? ? ? ?
?
???
?
???
??????????????????
??????????????????
??????????????????
??????????????????
Fig. 3. Convergence of the proposed CF scheme based on hierarchical game
in virtualized ultra-dense small cell networks. (a) Convergence of user-oriented
spectrum adaptive algorithm. (b) Convergence of user-oriented power adaptive
algorithm. (c) Convergence of price adaptive algorithm.
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Fig. 4. CF algorithm complexity with respect to the different number of
VRRs.
Further, the complexity of the proposed CF scheme is
evaluated in Fig. 4. The X-axis is the different number of
VRRs, and the Y-axis is the execution time of CF scheme.
The unit of time is second (s). The complexity is counted
under the condition that the iterations is 9 and the statistic
times is 20. We can see that the rise is gently with the
increasing number of VRRs. When the number of VRRs is 4,
the algorithm complexity is 13s. When the number of VRRs
is 36, the algorithm complexity is 26s. Thus, the number of
VRRs increases 8-fold while the complexity only increases
1-fold. Therefore, the proposed CF scheme is low-complexity.
B. Performance Comparison
We show performance curves from the following aspects:
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Fig. 5. Comparison of the total utility of VRRs for different schemes with
the different number of VRRs.
• Comparison of the total utility of VRRs with and without
virtualization in Fig. 5.
• Comparison of the utility of the VRP with and without
virtualization in Fig. 6.
• Comparison of the average energy efficiency in the whole
networks for different schemes in Fig. 7.
• Comparison of the system rate with and without virtual-
ization in Fig. 8.
• Comparison of the resource utilization ratio with and
without virtualization in Fig. 9.
• Comparison of the access-reject probability of VRRs with
and without virtualization in Fig. 10.
The total utility of VRRs is illustrated in Fig. 5. We compare
the performance of the CF scheme with the classical scheme
without virtualization. The classical scheme is with fixed
spectrum-allocation, average power-allocation, and average
price-allocation. More specifically, each small base station has
50 VRBs, and the power is 30 dBm. Each VRR get 3 VRBs,
and each small base station can serve 16 VRRs at most. The
power is 0.02*3, and the price adopts the statistical average
of CF algorithm. It is easy to understand that the total utility
of VRRs increases steadily with the growth of VRRs because
more VRRs will bring more revenue. We can also observe that
the CF scheme with virtualization always has an advantage
over the classical scheme without virtualization. When the
number of users is 44, the CF scheme with virtualization
achieves the utility improvement of almost 22% than the
classical scheme without virtualization. The reason is that
VRRs can receive better quality of service and connect to
a better condition of service with customized and on-demand
resource allocation. That is, a higher degree of freedom of
resource allocation is realized. Moreover, another reason is
that the lower resource price is consumed for VRRs. More
interestingly, when the network scale is extended through the
number of VRRs, the utility of VRRs still increases with
respect to the number of VRRs. Thus, the proposed CF scheme
is especially suited to the network, which is large-scale or
ultra-dense.
2169-3536 (c) 2018 IEEE. Translations and content mining are permitted for academic research only. Personal use is also permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See
http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2845913, IEEE Access
11
??????????????????
? ? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ??
?
????
????
????
????
????
????
?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????
Fig. 6. Comparison of the total utility of the VRP for different schemes with
the different number of VRRs.
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Fig. 7. Comparison of the average energy efficiency in the whole networks
for different schemes with the different number of VRRs.
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Fig. 8. Comparison of the system rate for different schemes with the different
number of VRRs.
We also evaluate the total utility of the VRP versus the
number of VRRs in Fig. 6. The classical scheme is same as the
one in Fig. 5. With the growth of VRRs, the utility of the VRP
increases gradually because VRRs consume more resources.
We can see that the utility of the CF scheme is always higher
than the utility of the classical scheme. Meanwhile, when the
number of VRRs is greater than 32, the superiority of the CF
scheme is more obvious than the classical scheme. The reason
is that more resources are leased in case of virtualization, thus,
more revenues are obtained. Therefore, similarly to Fig. 5, the
proposed CF scheme is applicable to the large-scale or ultra-
dense networks.
We evaluate the performance of the CF scheme in terms of
the average energy efficiency of the whole networks in Fig.
7. We can see that the CF scheme outperforms the classical
scheme that is same as the one in Fig. 5. This is because the
energy efficiency has been taken into account in the utility as
an optimal objective. It can also be observed that the curve
shows a descending tendency with the number of VRRs, which
can be explained by the different growth rates in the average
energy efficiency and the number of VRRs. Even so, when the
number of users is 36, 3-fold energy efficiency improvement
is achieved compared to the classical scheme.
We also evaluate the system rate with the different number
of VRRs in Fig. 8. The classical scheme for fixed spectrum-
allocation and average power-allocation is same as the one
in Fig. 5. It shows that the curves rise with the growth of
VRRs because of the multi-connectivity gain. Moreover, the
CF scheme has higher rate than the classical scheme. The
reason is that more VRRs are served with the same amount
of resources by virtualization and higher quality of service are
guaranteed by on-demand allocation. It can also be observed
that the performance improvement with a large number of
VRRs is higher than the one with a small amount of VRRs.
When the number of users is 8, the system rate with the
CF scheme is 2 Kbps higher than the one with the classical
scheme. When the number of users is 36, the system rate
with the CF scheme is 10 Kbps higher than the one with the
classical scheme.
As shown in Fig. 9, the resource utilization ratio using
different schemes with and without virtualization is compared.
The classical scheme adopts on-demand spectrum-allocation.
Each small base station has 50 VRBs, therefore the total
demands of VRRs served by an small base station cannot
exceed 50 if without virtualization. The resource utilization
ratio increases with the growth of VRRs, which is because
more resources are consumed. We can observe that the re-
source utilization ratio is equal when the number of users is
smaller than 32. The reason is that the resources are enough
to meet VRRs’ demands. Furthermore, it can be observed that
the resource utilization ratio using the CF scheme outperforms
the one using the classical scheme when the number of
VRRs is larger than 32. The reason is that the comparison
scheme adopts the same spectrum allocation algorithm as
the CF scheme but without using virtualization, which limits
the flexibility of resource allocation and each small base
station is only able to provide service for a certain number of
VRRs. In other words, when the number of VRRs becomes
large, the demands for resources become more, which may
result in some VRRs not being served due to the insufficient
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Fig. 9. Comparison of the resource utilization ratio with and without
virtualization for the different number of VRRs.
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Fig. 10. Comparison of the access-reject probability with and without
virtualization for the different number of VRRs.
resources if without virtualization. Thus, the residual resources
are wasted and the resource utilization ratio is low. On the
contrary, virtualization can integrate resources among multiple
small base stations, which reduces the resource waste and
improves the resource utilization ratio. We can calculate the
promotion of the resource utilization ratio is about 4% when
the number of VRRs is 40.
Further, we represent the access-reject probability with and
without virtualization in Fig. 10. The classic scheme for
spectrum-allocation is same as the scheme in Fig. 8. The
access-reject probability refers that the ratio of VRRs that
cannot be served due to the limited resources. We can see
that for both CF scheme and classical scheme, the access-
reject probability is zero when the number of VRRs is not
larger than 28, which is because the resources are adequate to
satisfy the demands. It can be seen that when the number of
VRRs is 32, the access-reject probability begins to increase
for the classical scheme while is still zero for the CF scheme,
which is because the resources of some small base stations are
inadequate to meet VRRs’ demands if without virtualization.
That is, by integrating resources with virtualization, more
VRRs can receive service at the same time. Moreover, we
can see that when the number of VRRs is more than 32, the
access-reject probability increases with the increasing VRRs
for both CF scheme and classical scheme. With the growth
of VRRs, the tendency is upward because of the inadequate
resources and the added traffic. However, the access-reject
probability with virtualization is always lower than the one
without virtualization , and the superiority is even more
obvious when the number of VRRs is large. This is because the
integrating and sharing characteristics of virtualization, which
means that the same amount of resources is able to meet more
VRRs demands. It can be calculated that the access-reject
probability of the CF scheme is 18% less than the one of
the classical scheme when the number of VRRs is 40. That
is, the same resources can serve 7 people more with the CF
scheme. Therefore, combining with the Fig. 8, a conclusion
can be obtained that the CF scheme can be applied in the
ultra-dense large-connection scenario.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the user-oriented resource
management problem with virtualization in ultra-dense small
cell networks based on hierarchical game. We proposed a two-
layer architecture specifying the necessity of resource manage-
ment from physical networks to virtual networks. In virtual
networks, there exist two components: VRPs and VRRs. We
formulated the problem as a hierarchical game to maximize
the utilities of both the VRP and VRRs. In the VRP layer,
the VRP decides and broadcasts the price for VRRs based on
demands. In the VRR layer, VRRs evaluate the demands for
VRBs based on the communication requirements and the price
provided by the VRP, and determine the transmission power.
We formulated the utility of VRRs as a joint optimization
function in spectrum and power. To solve the problem effi-
ciently, we used decomposition method and standard convex
optimization method to obtain the closed-form solutions for
spectrum, power, and price, respectively. Most importantly,
we proposed a low-complexity CF algorithm and HNE was
found. Simulation results confirmed the convergence and ef-
fectiveness of the proposed CF algorithm.
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